Achieving an Objective
This is going to be a politico-philosophical post, I'm sorry.
Back when I was a freshman in college, I read "Anthem". This was back when I was a communist, and I haven't touched Ayn Rand since. This is the kind of choice that strikes one as a rational decision, particularly as hating Ayn Rand is in vogue among a certain group of intelligentsia, to which I belonged and in which many of my peers still reside.
Because it passes the time, and because I figured "well, what the hell, it's important to be literate," I picked up a copy of Atlas Shrugged and started reading it on the train. Interspersed with it, I've also been reading Rand's philosophical essays, as well as—for unrelated reasons—rereading the story of Stalin's great purges. I feel unclean, but perhaps writing can as a form of absolution serve:
That book is dangerous.
The point at which I realised a truth about myself which I'm no longer actually terribly uncomfortable with was the point at which Francisco d'Anconia was saying things that I had said, and in near to my own words. This was, in a fashion, intensely liberating. I began to devour the book, because I found that when I got off the train in the mornings I was inspired, like the world suddenly made sense again.
So I suppose I'm an Objectivist, which—as a fiscally-conservative/socially-libertarian neoconservative—I suppose I've always been, essentially, since I realised the destructive, ridiculous folly of communism. It's not really life-changing—supposedly people list Atlas Shrugged after the Bible in terms of books that change their lives—but it has made me... strangely happy, I suppose, for a rational conclusion? Odd.
It's not something I wish to proselytise, of course; I think the book is readable, but it's not something you "have to read". It's not particularly well-written, as it's not really even a terribly good work of fiction. Ayn Rand, like George Orwell, saw the ills of the Soviet Union and wrote about them. It's not exactly clear to me why Rand is so widely derided when Orwell's frankly juvenile attempt at political commentary is allowed to stand.
My first inclination would be to chalk it up to Orwell's writing talent, because Orwell's short writing is quite good, but neither Animal Farm nor 1984 are masterpieces of the prose form. I suspect the actual answer is substantially less pretty, which is that it amounts to a difference of political correctness. Rational self-interest—the idea that, as Rand says, "I shall not live my life for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine"—is unpopular, because it goes against certain principles of communalism that are not accepted in certain circles.
Left-wing academia—I say being not unversed in the field, having studied a stereotypically hippie topic (anthropology) at a stereotypically hippie school (the University of Colorado)—has a very uncomfortable relationship with certain things. For instance, Richard Dawkins. My professors liked Dawkins because of his intensely cogent analysis of religion.
However, they disliked Dawkins because of his games-theory approach to biology and, by extension, to human interaction. The notion that there was a current of self-interest—Dawkin's seminal work is called The Selfish Gene—in behaviour set them on edge, to the point where they were willing to simply reject the entire concept out of hand as "determinism" and "reductionism", which they used as slurs. Functionalists like Ardrey were similarly dismissed; Marxism somehow blended with science in bizarre parody of the concept of the latter.
I do not—emphatically do not—believe that there is a "liberal indoctrination" of students at universities; I don't consider this to have a political bent. I'm not sure how else to phrase "left-wing academia" because they hold liberal philosophies and apply academics to them, so. I will not say that students are indoctrinated into liberalism or that professors are shills for some mythical liberal establishment. I will say—with equal emphasis—that the traditionally left-wing fields of gender studies, anthropology, sociology, and so forth are shot through with a current of "truthiness" that makes George Bush look like George Washington. There are exceptions, but it would not be fair to describe vast swaths of the discourse as being intellectually bankrupt.
This is also, I somewhat suspect, why I was brought up by my peers in high school, who went to other schools but studied similar subjects, and by my professors and the literature I read and the websites I followed to dismiss Objectivism as a political philosophy out of hand, without examining it—the notion that it, its followers and philosophers, its conclusions and epistemology could be simply ignored without the practise of rational thought. Rational thought is, unfortunately, not central to or upheld by the disciplines I studied at the university.
Objectivism was cast to me as a dog-eat-dog celebration of acquisition and material wealth, the unapologetic embracing of a world of Scrooge McDucks, swimming in their gold coins with reckless abandon and cackling at the suffering of starving children. It was phrased as a heartless orgy of greed—as opposed to an embrace of personal ambition, the idea that charity was acceptable, but the expectation of charity was anathema: because we need to succeed on our own. Atlas Shrugged is not intended to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent.
This is not, however, a conclusion that my professors would've accepted. Nor is it one many of my friends will accept, nor my high school and university peers. Perplexingly, alas, I find most people have not read Atlas Shrugged and are conversant in Objectivism only insofar as its Wikipedia entry, at best. This includes the disciplines in which I received my formal training.
I'm not sure where that leaves those disciplines. I'm more clear on where it leaves me: content, and with eyes opened. Mm.
/a
Because it passes the time, and because I figured "well, what the hell, it's important to be literate," I picked up a copy of Atlas Shrugged and started reading it on the train. Interspersed with it, I've also been reading Rand's philosophical essays, as well as—for unrelated reasons—rereading the story of Stalin's great purges. I feel unclean, but perhaps writing can as a form of absolution serve:
That book is dangerous.
The point at which I realised a truth about myself which I'm no longer actually terribly uncomfortable with was the point at which Francisco d'Anconia was saying things that I had said, and in near to my own words. This was, in a fashion, intensely liberating. I began to devour the book, because I found that when I got off the train in the mornings I was inspired, like the world suddenly made sense again.
So I suppose I'm an Objectivist, which—as a fiscally-conservative/socially-libertarian neoconservative—I suppose I've always been, essentially, since I realised the destructive, ridiculous folly of communism. It's not really life-changing—supposedly people list Atlas Shrugged after the Bible in terms of books that change their lives—but it has made me... strangely happy, I suppose, for a rational conclusion? Odd.
It's not something I wish to proselytise, of course; I think the book is readable, but it's not something you "have to read". It's not particularly well-written, as it's not really even a terribly good work of fiction. Ayn Rand, like George Orwell, saw the ills of the Soviet Union and wrote about them. It's not exactly clear to me why Rand is so widely derided when Orwell's frankly juvenile attempt at political commentary is allowed to stand.
My first inclination would be to chalk it up to Orwell's writing talent, because Orwell's short writing is quite good, but neither Animal Farm nor 1984 are masterpieces of the prose form. I suspect the actual answer is substantially less pretty, which is that it amounts to a difference of political correctness. Rational self-interest—the idea that, as Rand says, "I shall not live my life for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine"—is unpopular, because it goes against certain principles of communalism that are not accepted in certain circles.
Left-wing academia—I say being not unversed in the field, having studied a stereotypically hippie topic (anthropology) at a stereotypically hippie school (the University of Colorado)—has a very uncomfortable relationship with certain things. For instance, Richard Dawkins. My professors liked Dawkins because of his intensely cogent analysis of religion.
However, they disliked Dawkins because of his games-theory approach to biology and, by extension, to human interaction. The notion that there was a current of self-interest—Dawkin's seminal work is called The Selfish Gene—in behaviour set them on edge, to the point where they were willing to simply reject the entire concept out of hand as "determinism" and "reductionism", which they used as slurs. Functionalists like Ardrey were similarly dismissed; Marxism somehow blended with science in bizarre parody of the concept of the latter.
I do not—emphatically do not—believe that there is a "liberal indoctrination" of students at universities; I don't consider this to have a political bent. I'm not sure how else to phrase "left-wing academia" because they hold liberal philosophies and apply academics to them, so. I will not say that students are indoctrinated into liberalism or that professors are shills for some mythical liberal establishment. I will say—with equal emphasis—that the traditionally left-wing fields of gender studies, anthropology, sociology, and so forth are shot through with a current of "truthiness" that makes George Bush look like George Washington. There are exceptions, but it would not be fair to describe vast swaths of the discourse as being intellectually bankrupt.
This is also, I somewhat suspect, why I was brought up by my peers in high school, who went to other schools but studied similar subjects, and by my professors and the literature I read and the websites I followed to dismiss Objectivism as a political philosophy out of hand, without examining it—the notion that it, its followers and philosophers, its conclusions and epistemology could be simply ignored without the practise of rational thought. Rational thought is, unfortunately, not central to or upheld by the disciplines I studied at the university.
Objectivism was cast to me as a dog-eat-dog celebration of acquisition and material wealth, the unapologetic embracing of a world of Scrooge McDucks, swimming in their gold coins with reckless abandon and cackling at the suffering of starving children. It was phrased as a heartless orgy of greed—as opposed to an embrace of personal ambition, the idea that charity was acceptable, but the expectation of charity was anathema: because we need to succeed on our own. Atlas Shrugged is not intended to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent.
This is not, however, a conclusion that my professors would've accepted. Nor is it one many of my friends will accept, nor my high school and university peers. Perplexingly, alas, I find most people have not read Atlas Shrugged and are conversant in Objectivism only insofar as its Wikipedia entry, at best. This includes the disciplines in which I received my formal training.
I'm not sure where that leaves those disciplines. I'm more clear on where it leaves me: content, and with eyes opened. Mm.
/a
La Chevre! 28.08.2009 - 9h08 |
I feel that you embrace your labels too fondly, Collieman. Who knows, maybe you derive some sort of pleasure from the labels' polarizing effects. I am only conversant with objectivism, as you say, only insofar as having read (part) of the Wikipedia article. And Anthem. And I've met a fair number of Rand's devotees. I don't think I need anything beyond that to determine that I find the philosophy utterly lame. Oh well. We're growing apart, Klissy-pie, and that breaks my little heart. |
Comrade Alex 28.08.2009 - 9h59 |
I'm not exactly certain that we are. I thought you were a Friedman free-market capitalist person? +ca |
La Chevre! 8.09.2009 - 12h55 |
Sort of. I appreciate Friedman, certainly, and I am not really a Keynesian. I agree with his idea that in a shuttered and restrictive society freer markets will cultivate other freedoms, but we have different ideas of just how free they should be. The other night I tried to explain to a drunk girl that I was "libertarian-lite", but even that tepid description vastly overstates my Friedmanism. I am a believer in the power of self-interest and I am an avowed utilitarian. I can conceive numerous utility functions--including my own--that would prefer a society with an inherent, non-trivial amount of wealth redistribution. Perhaps objectivism could be twisted to work for me, but I seem to have little in common with its adherents. |
Comrade Alex 8.09.2009 - 9h06 |
I should think it would be your avowed utilitarian-ness that reflects our drift, m'dear--but even at that, I should think us less apart than when you first met me, when I was a wee communistical lad and disposed towards idealism. In the event, I would argue--and I daresay Rand would agree--that the key driving motivator of Objectivism is this: in a world of limited resources and unlimited wants, the only reasonable and fair way to distribute these is by means of self-interest, which is a biological imperative. Any other method of achieving this end is contra-biological and thus suspect (1), because it relies on moralities and ethics, which being personal and non-objective are thus unfair. We rely on biology and other rational metrics because we live in a rational world. That is, your car does not care how much you want to go somewhere--indeed, your car does not care if you need to drive to the hospital: if you do not have petrol, it won't move. Period. "The greatest good" does not drive the rain; "religious purity" does not fix broken limbs. So, we look to the most rational system possible. If this is accepted--it is not by everyone, because in its purest conception it would seem to leave some people starving in the streets (this is as opposed to socialism, which leaves nobody starving on the streets and everyone half-starving just off them)--then the argument for unrestricted free-marketism comes from the understanding that, absent money, the way to satisfy self-interest is from the trigger of a gun. Objectivism as a socio/politico/economic philosophy is not pure libertarianism. Government exists, but its goal is to foster and protect the exchange of resources in a free society and nothing else. Acceptable functions of the government may be: • A military, to protect the interests of the citizenry from foreign threats; • A police force, to protect the interests of the citizenry from looters and other domestic threats; • A courts system, to protect the interests of the citizenry by allowing a fair redress of grievances. It's possible that this would extend to infrastructure, such as roads. It's not clear to me that Rand has a position on this. Objectivism is also not utilitarianism in a social sense, although it is presumably utilitarian on an individual level. If Company A is an established entity, for instance, and Company B is an upstart competitor with a superior product that threatens Company A's livelihood, Objectivism rejects any other solution than capitalism to resolve this. It is not appropriate for Company A to use government connections or other corrupt systems to shut Company B down; similarly it is not appropriate for the government to preserve Company A even if, in its employment of countless tens of thousands its loss would be substantially damaging to many people. Market capitalism offers a means of resolving otherwise problematic concerns. For example, consider fuel economy. Improving the fuel economy of the American automobile fleet will, of necessity, entail killing a certain number of motorists. Doing nothing about the fuel economy, however, will presumably result in other deaths when, as the Day After Tomorrow makes clear, global warming floods New York City and fills it with hungry wolves. How else do we resolve this but the pressures of a free market? You understand the potential of capitalism, I know. I'm not sure exactly where our disconnect would be? +ca 1. Note that this does not represent a rejection of altruism. Dawkins addresses this in The Selfish Gene. |
La Chevre! 8.09.2009 - 10h26 |
Yes, I do understand the potential of capitalism and I believe strongly in the meritocratic ideal that it implies. But I also believe that the state you described (which sounded like a pure libertarian state to me, at least) does not sufficiently promote meritocracy. In your example of a large Company A being challenged by an innovative, new Company B, I wholeheartedly agree that B deserves rewards for its advances. But very often you see situations where A can use its size to prevent any real competition from arising unless it is extremely innovative or extremely well-funded. Anti-trust law can prevent this, but I'd think this presents objectivists with a dilemma: on the one hand if anti-trust law exists then you are hindering A from engaging in "normal" firm behavior such as providing deep discounts in the markets where B emerges; on the other hand without anti-trust law you will inevitably stifle many firms such as B that could improve overall well-being. I'm sure that objectivism has an answer, but it would seem to me that this is a critically weak point of the philosophy. There are many other problems I have when it comes to libertarian--and, in most cases I'd think, objectivist--government. One is the place of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, which are designed to maximize overall utility by internalizing externalities such as river pollution or the benefits of universal vaccination. Do you institute these taxes, or are they anathema because they provide non-market incentives to change behavior? Now I'll address some of your earlier points. First, I don't think that it makes sense to embrace a philosophy because it is biologically rational. The goal of life on this planet is not to create intelligence or to maximize overall welfare--or at least we don't have any way to prove that it is. Life exists for uncertain reasons and for uncertain purposes. It wants to propagate and sustain itself, but it doesn't seem to want to advance itself into higher stages of being or anything like that. We humans are special and very lucky because we have been endowed with brains that allow us to change our environment far in excess of any other lifeform. Self-interest got us this far, but we should critically consider what self-interest actually is, and whether or not it really does represent the best way to live. Secondly and relatedly, things that are out of our control, such as the fact that cars require fuel to run, should not dispose us to reduce ourselves to primal beings. So what if x requires y or s cannot influence t? How can that possibly buttress the case for any philosophy? Third: Strawmen? Really? Fourth: I don't think I understand the paragraph about fuel economy at all. To close, I'd like to note that I feel like there is far too little nuance in the statement "Any other method of achieving this end is contra-biological and thus suspect." Lack of nuance seems to be a trend in objectivist thought. I say this because in my interactions with objectivists thus far in my life, none have ever meaningfully disagreed with the established objectivist position. This is a problem. I'm afraid I'm still sad, Klis. Alas. |
Comrade Alex 9.09.2009 - 9h12 |
I don't find this especially convincing. You seem to be on board with the basic principles of free-market capitalism, with limited controls on its exercise and, presumably/in so doing, excess. Then you say my self-identification as an Objectivist--which is essentially simply an embrace of capitalism as a logical, rational means to structuring society--"breaks your little heart," but beyond an exceedingly vague ad hominem you don't seem able to articulate why this might be so. I suspect, again, that our "growing apart" is a trend that has been ongoing for some time and, at least on a philosophic level, probably has substantially more to do with your avowed embracing of utilitarianism, a philosophy I find monstrous. We have, however, been over this before. If you were to articulate the differences between us, I suspect it would amount to my belief that the greatest possible freedom is associated with the greatest possible freedom of the market, and your belief that in specific, limited instances controls on laissez-faire capitalism can produce a greater overall social good. This is a disagreement that makes sense, and could reasonably be had by reasonable people. I do not see where the sadness lies--unless you think Friedman made Keyes "sad"? Specific responses: Objectivism would, I believe, tend to encourage an attempt, if not success, at monopolisation. In a purely Objectivist state, where the government is either non-corrupt or so small that its corruption doesn't matter, this monopolies would emerge from practical business matters as opposed to graft or pulling strings; indeed, Rand is very critical of companies who achieve dominance by connections as opposed to effort. In a practical sense, it's not wholly clear to me that this is necessarily problematic. Compare the American auto industry, which has been heavily controlled, to the American software and computer industry, which has not. Certainly one would not expect Moore's law levels of growth and improvement in car manufacturing--but we might've expected at least some progress. Instead, innovation in automotive design and engineering, where it has been achieved at all, has been more on a national level--American auto-makers competing with Germans, for instance--than on a corporate one (Ford competing with GM). In the software industry, people have been bitching about a complete or effective monopoly held by Microsoft for ten or fifteen years now. This monopoly has not, however, demonstrably hindered the progress of computer technology--and has not, in fact, prevented a remarkable resurgence in growth by both corporate (Apple) and non-corporate (*nixish) software solutions. This is true in the "browser wars" as well. It is technically accurate that Microsoft has faced anti-trust litigation, but I know of few analysts who would chalk up the growth of Firefox to anti-trust as opposed to its ability to provide a credible alternative. A natural objection would be that software, which deals with non-physical objects, has a lower barrier to entry than automobiles. This is true. Instead, it may serve to look at the aerospace industry, which has seen neither the bailouts nor the supposition that government intervention is beneficial to their operations. Centennial Airport alone, a tiny strip out where I used to live in Aurora, hosted two airplane manufacturing companies; off the top of my head planes and helicopters are made here by a dozen different companies. Actually, one can look at telecommunications. While telcos have certainly innovated substantially more in areas of broader competition--my cell phone plan, for instance, entails no roaming charges, no out of area charges, no long-distance fees, and allows me to pull megabyte+ bandwidth nearly anywhere I can get a signal--even broadband Internet, the regulation of which is a highly contentious issue, has shown substantial progress. At a local market level, cable Internet operators exert near-complete monopolies--and yet, while American broadband lags behind access in the rest of the world, the previous ten years have seen penetration increase from 3.5 to, in urban markets, 92%, and speeds increase by a factor of ten or more without a commensurate increase in cost. This is because cable providers have figured out a way to monetise additional services through plan tiering, not because of government intervention or restrictions placed on account of their monopoly status. In the event, I would not agree that life exists for "uncertain reasons and for uncertain purposes". Absent divine intervention, you address the reason life exists yourself: self-propagation. "Higher stages of being" is a metaphysical concern, not a biological one. We humans are special, in the sense of being able to affect the world more strongly than many other creatures, using tools and complex language, but we are bound by the same basic drives; this is why only pathological cases elect to pursue "higher stages of being" as opposed and in exclusion to sustenance or propagation. Indeed, we are lucky precisely because we can--or should--understand our place in a rational universe, and that rationalism is a (or, in my opinion, the most effective) philosophy for contending with this. Economics may be mysterious, but in positing that rationalism is not the best way of addressing the economic question, you seem to be treading dangerously close to suggesting a ghost in the machine. +ca |
La Chevre! 18.09.2009 - 7h35 |
I stepped back for a second to compose a long reply, but then I never found the will to finish it. I have several paragraphs of anti-monopoly stuff, but when I started looking for the best antitrust cases to cite I realized that this was going way too far. Perhaps if we were actually talking and being less pedantic this conversation might be interesting, but here we are. And, for the record, "avowed utilitarian" may have been a poor choice of words. "More utilitarian than anything else, really" would be more apt. |